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Abstract
According to Pareto (1896), the distribution of income depends on “the
nature of the people comprising a society, on the organization of the lat-
ter, and, also, in part, on chance.” An overlapping generations model of
marriage, fertility and income distribution is developed here. The “nature
of the people” is captured by attitudes toward marriage, divorce, fertility,
and children. Singles search for mates in a marriage market. They are free
to accept or reject marriage proposals. Married agents make their decisions
through bargaining about work, and the quantity and quality of children.
They can divorce. Social policies, such as child tax credits or child support
requirements, reflect the “organization of the (society).” Finally, “chance”
is modelled by randomness in income, opportunities for marriage, and mar-
ital bliss.
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1. Introduction
At any point of time in the U.S. some adults are married while others are not,
some women have large families and others have small ones, some families are
rich, while others are poor, and some children can expect a bright future, others a
dim one. Why do families differ so much and does it matter? This is the question
addressed here. To answer it, an overlapping generations model of the family is
built. The model has four key ingredients. First, marriage is modeled along the
search-theoretic lines of Mortenson (1988). Each period males and females must
make a decision on whether or not to stay with their mates. If an adult rejects his
or her mate, then he or she is free to look for another one in the future. Second,
in line with the work by Mansur and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney
(1981), decisions within a marriage are arrived at via Nash Bargaining. Third,
as in Barro and Becker (1988) and Razin and Ben-Zion (1975), adults decide
how many children to have. Fourth, following the work of Becker and Tomes
(1993) and Loury (1981), parents must decide how much time and goods to invest
in their children. In addition to luck, these parental investments determine the
productivity of a child when he or she grows up.
In the equilibrium modeled heterogeneity abounds. Some people are married,
others are either divorced or single. There are large families and there are small
ones. Households run the gamut from rich to poor. Some children can expect
to lead fortunate lives, while others can’t. As in the real world, family structure
matters. In the model a significant number of children live with a single mother.
Some of these mothers are unwed, others are divorced. These children grow up
to earn much less than children raised in a two-parent family. The girls from
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single-parent families are also more likely to experience an out-of-wedlock birth
or a divorce than the girls from two-parent families. And so the cycle perpetuates
itself, implying a low degree of intergenerational mobility. There is also a negative
relationship between income and fertility. That is, poor families tend to have more
children. This exacerbates income inequality. To illustrate the model’s mechanics
two policy experiments are undertaken. Specifically, the effects of child tax credits
and child support payments are investigated.
This not the only dynamic general equilibrium of marriage and divorce.1 Aiya-
gari, Greenwood and Guner (2000) have combined the Mortenson (1988) paradigm
with the Becker and Tomes (1993) framework to model the plight of single-parent
families. In their analysis family size is held fixed. Husband and wife play a
noncooperative Nash game. Regalia and Rios Rull (1999) also develop a model
of marriage and divorce to analyze the rise in single motherhood since the 1970s.
They attribute a significant fraction of this increase to the (relative) rise in female
1The need for dynamic general equilibrium models of the family has been noted by labor
economists. For instance, according to McElroy (1997, p. 53) while there has been much work on
partial equilibrium models of the household “little analysis has been based upon the appropriate
general equilibrium framework, the marriage market.” Weiss (1997, p.120) in his survey on the
literature on marriage and divorce states that when “examining the economic contributions, the
main obstacles is the scarcity of equilibrium models which carefully tie the individual behavior
with the market constraints and outcomes. Consequently, we do yet have a convincing model
which explains aggregate family formation and dissolution.” The study for such models for
policy analysis has been noted. “A model of marital search would be a more accurate descriptor
of AFDC entry and exits ... ” than a model of job search, says Moffitt (1992, 26). Hoynes
(1997, p. 95) echoes this sentiment stating that relative to the classic, but static, Beckerian
model of marriage “a dynamic model of marital search is a natural extension, but has yet to be
developed in the literature.”
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wages. In their setup a single decision maker maximizes some common set of pref-
erences for the family — the unitary preference model. Two questions arise. Why
explore the utility of Nash bargaining as a solution concept for family decision
making? And, is it important to factor fertility into general equilibrium analyses
of the family? As will be seen, both of these ingredients have important impli-
cations for any analysis of family oriented public policies. Therefore, if society
wants effective anti-poverty programs, they should be investigated. The case for
including these features in dynamic general equilibrium models of marriage and
divorce is now presented.
Nash Bargaining: So, why use Nash Bargaining to model decisions within the
household? First, males and females may have differences in attitudes toward the
desirable quantity and quality of children. In fact, this is inevitable if divorce is
permitted. While it may reasonable to assume that a male and female share the
same momentary utility in marriage, it is not reasonable to assume that they do
upon divorce. For in life after divorce each party’s income and expenditure will
differ, they may remarry, etc. Forward-looking agents will take the possibility of
divorce into account before and during marriage. This will lead to differences in
attitudes toward kids, even if they share the same momentary utility in marriage.
For instance, imagine that a couple would both like five children and believe that
the woman should stay at home and raise them, at least provided that the marriage
lasts. The woman realizes that if a divorce occurs she will be stuck raising five
children and have no work experience. Consequently, when taking the possibility
of divorce into account, she may prefer to have fewer children and go to work.
Nash Bargaining allows for such differences in tastes to be easily reconciled. One
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party can effect transfers to the other until an agreement is attained.2
Second, there is evidence that allocations within the household are not decided
in a manner consistent with a single decision maker who maximizes some common
set of preferences for the family — the unitary decision model. For instance, when
government child allowances were transferred from husbands to wives in Great
Britain during the late 1970s intrahousehold resource allocations tilted toward
wives — see Lundberg, Pollack andWales (1997). Furthermore, the higher the ratio
of eligible males to females in a population, the more resource allocations within a
marriage favor the wife. According to Chiappori, Fortin, and Lacroix (1998) this
finding is consistent with a Nash Bargaining model where each party takes into
account the value of their options outside of the marriage. That is, the value of
being single taking into account the probability of finding a future mate. This is
exactly the type of framework that is modeled here. In a similar vein, Rubalcava
and Thomas (2000) find that the presence of AFDC shifts resources allocations in
low-income married households with children toward women, presumably because
it raises the outside option of single life for women.3
Third, the assumed mode of household decision making matters. It has im-
portant implications for the public policy predictions that arise from models of
marriage, divorce, and fertility. For example, take the case of child support pay-
ments studied here. These payment are designed to help the plight of children
living with divorced mothers. Males will find marriages less attractive when they
2In a unitary decision model of marriage these differences in attitudes are difficult to resolve.
Regalia and Rios Rull (1999) resolve this conflict by letting the woman in a match choose the
number of children to have.
3In fact, Greenwood, Guner and Knowles (2000) use the model developed here to study
AFDC. They find this, precisely.
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have to make child support payments upon divorce. Suppose they do have to make
these payments. In the parameterized version of the model presented, the equilib-
rium number of marriages plummets when a unitary decision model is assumed.
There is only a moderate decline in the number of marriages, however, when
Nash Bargaining is assumed. This occurs because young females make offsetting
transfers to young males to make marriages viable. Hence, intrahousehold real-
locations may have important implications for society’s redistribution programs.
This needs to be studied.
Fertility: Why is it important to include a fertility decision in models of mar-
riage and divorce? First, to most, the decisions to get married and have children
are inextricably linked. Therefore, it seems natural to model these two choices
together. Furthermore, family structure and the well being of children are closely
connected empirically. Other things equal, families with lower incomes tend to
have more children [see Knowles (1999)]. Additionally, single mothers tend to have
more children than married ones. Hence, resources per child are less in low-income
families (often single-parent families), both because there is less income and be-
cause this income has to be spread over more members. This has implications for
income inequality at a point in time and for the transmission of inequality across
time. For example, it is well known that children from single-parent families are
much more likely to drop out of school, to be unemployed, and to experience out-
of-wedlock births [McLanahan and Sandefur (1994)]. It’s an interesting question
to ask why a woman should choose to have children out of wedlock. The answer
to this can only come from a model where both the decisions to marry and have
children are modelled explicitly.
Second, the reason for most anti-poverty programs is to improve the plight of
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children. To design effective public policy programs, the impact that anti-poverty
schemes have on fertility must be taken into account. Take for example the child
tax credit program studied here. With child tax credits, families will now have
more income per child, other things equal. Thus, their children should be better
off. But, other things may not be equal, if such a policy promotes larger family
size. In the calculations undertaken here, a child tax credit fails to elevate the
level of well being in society precisely due to an increase in family size.
2. Economic environment
Consider an economy populated by two groups of agents, females and males.
Agents live for four periods: two periods as children, and two periods as adults.
Let young and old refer to the first and second period of adulthood respectively. At
any point in time, the female and male populations each consist of a continuum of
children and a continuum of adults. Children become adults after they have been
raised by their parents for two periods. Each adult is indexed by a productivity
level. Let x denote the type (productivity) of an adult female, and z denote the
type (productivity) of an adult male. Assume that x and z are contained in the
sets X = {x1, x2, . . . , xS} and Z = {z1, z2, . . . , zS}.
At the beginning of each period, there exists a marriage market for single
agents. Any single agent can take a draw from this market. Agents are free to
accept or reject a mate as they desire. If a single agent accepts a draw, s/he is
married for the current period, provided of course, that the other person agrees
too. Otherwise, the agent is single and can take a new draw at the beginning of
the next period. Similarly, at the beginning of each period, married agents decide
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to remain married or get divorced. A divorced agent needs to remain single one
period before having a new draw. Therefore, given the two-period overlapping
generations structure remarriage is ruled out. Furthermore, assume that agents
only match with people of the same generation.
Females are only fecund for the first period of their adult life. Therefore, each
period, young married couples and young single adult females decide how many
children to have. A child has equal chances of being a female or a male. Let
k denote the number of children a female has. Assume that k is contained in
the set K = {0, 1, ...,K}. Children stay with their mothers, if their parents get
divorced. A divorced male has to pay child support payments to his former wife
after divorce.
Agents are endowed with one unit of (nonsleeping) time in each period. Fe-
males must split this time between work, child-care, and leisure. Males divide
their time between work and leisure. A married male has to spend a fixed amount
of time per child on homework.
Married agents derive utility from the consumption of a public household good,
from human capital investment in their children, from leisure, and from marital
bliss. Consumption of this household good depends upon the number of adults
and children in the family. Parents must decide how much time and goods to
invest in their children. This determines the level of human capital possessed by
their children. Parents treat their children equally. Single males care only about
their own consumption of goods and leisure and they do not worry about human
capital investment in their children. When a male marries a female with children,
however, he derives utility from the human capital investment in his stepchildren.
A single mother must make the decision on her own about how much time and
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money to invest in her kids.
After two periods with their mother, children are endowed with productivity
levels that depend on the human capital investment received throughout their
childhood. Each period the oldest adult males and females die and are replaced
by the oldest children who enter into the marriage market.
2.1. Preferences
Females: Let the momentary utility function for a woman be
F (c, e, k, 1− l − t) ≡ U (c) + V (e, k) +R(1− l − t− ιfk)
≡ c
νf
νf
+ ωf
kξf
ξf
eϑf
ϑf
+ δf
(1− l − t− ιfk)
ςf
ςf
.
Here c is the consumption of household production, which is a public good for the
family, k is the number of children, and e is human capital investment per child.
Females allocate l units of their time for work, and t units of it for child care or
nurture. They also incur a fixed time cost of ιf per child.
Males: A male’s attitude toward children depends upon his marital status.
Males spend n units of their time working. The utility function for a married
male is described by
M(c, e, k, 1− n) ≡ U (c) + P (e, k) + S(1− n− ιmk)
≡ c
νm
νm
+ ωm
kξm
ξm
eϑm
ϑm
+ δm
(1− n− ιmk)
ςm
ςm
.
Married males incur a fixed time cost of ιm per child. The functions V and P
imply that the married male’s attitudes toward the welfare of children is allowed
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to differ from the female’s. The utility function for a single male can be expressed
simply as M (c, e, 0, 1− n); a single male does not realize any utility from the
children borne through previous relationships.
2.2. Household consumption
Let p denote the number of parents in a household. Then, the consumption for a
household with p parents and k children is given by
c = Ψ(p, k)[Y (l, n; x, z)− d]− γJ(q), for q = m, s,
where
Ψ(p, k) =
µ
1
p+ bk
¶η
, 0 < η < 1, 0 < b < 1,
and
Y (l, n; x, z) =

(xl + zn), for a married couple,
xl, for a single woman,
zn, for a single man,
and where the indicator function J returns a value of one for a married household
and zero otherwise so that J(m) = 1 and J(s) = 0.
The function Y has a clear interpretation under the above parameterization.
The variables x and z can be thought of as the market wages for type-x females
and type-z males. The function Ψ translates household production into the con-
sumption realized by adult family members. There are scale effects in household
consumption in the sense that each additional child costs less to feed and clothe
than the one before. Still, it does cost more to maintain the extra child. Likewise,
the second adult costs less than the first. The variable d represents the amount of
household production that is used for investment in children. A single male will
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always set this to zero; because, either he has no children or he doesn’t realize
utility from them.
The parameter γ represents the quality of the match between a male and
a female. Let γ ∈ G = {γ1, γ2, ..., γm} be a discrete random variable. For an
unmarried couple this variable is drawn, after they are matched but before the
marriage decision, according to distribution function Γ(γh) = Pr[γ = γh]. For
a married couple the variable γ then evolves over time according the process
∆(γn|γh) = Pr[γ0 = γn|γ = γh]. Given the value drawn for γ0, each party in a
marriage decides whether to remain married.
2.3. Transmission of Human Capital
Human capital investment per child in a household with k children is given by
e = Q(t, d, k) ≡
µ
t
kκ1
¶α
(
d
kκ2
)1−α, for 0 < κ1,κ2 < 1,
which transforms the child-care time of the mother, t, and the amount of the
home produced good, d, into human capital investment, e. Recall that children
are nurtured for two periods. At the end of every period the children of the oldest
generation enter into the marriage market as single adults. The productivity levels
for females are drawn from the distribution
Ξ(xi|e−2 + e−1) = Pr[x = xi|e−2 + e−1],
and for males from
Λ(zj|e−1 + e−1) = Pr[z = zj|e−2 + e−1],
where e−1 and e−2 indicate the human capital investment during the two periods
of an agent’s childhood. The distribution functions Ξ and Λ are stochastically
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increasing in e−2+ e−1 in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance. Thus,
higher human capital investment in children by parents increases the likelihood
that children will be successful in life.
The conditional distribution Ξ is represented by a discrete approximation to
a lognormal distribution with mean, µx|e, and standard deviation, σx|e. Similarly,
suppose that Λ is also given by a discrete approximation to a lognormal with
mean, µz|e, and standard deviation, σz|e. These conditional means are given by,
µx|e = µz|e = ln[ε1(e−2 + e−1)
ε2 ], for ε2 ∈ (0, 1),
where the ε’s are the parameters governing the technology that maps human
capital investment by parents into productivity levels.
After the first period of adulthood the productivity levels for females and males
evolve according to the following transition functions:
X(xj|xi) = Pr[x0 = xj|x = xi],
and
Z(zj|zi) = Pr[z0 = zj|z = zi],
where x0 and z0 denote the next-period values. These Markov chains are con-
structed to approximate an AR(1) in logarithms.4
3. Decision Making
3.1. Household Activity – Single Old Adults
A single old female of type x with k children will solve the following problem:
4The discrete approximations for Ξ, Λ, X, and Z follow the procedure outlined in Tauchen
(1986).
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G2(x, k, z) =max
l,t,d
F (c, e, k, 1− l − t) P(1)
subject to
c = Ψ(1, k)[Y (l, 0; x, 0) +A(z, k)− d]
and
e = Q(t, d, k),
where
A(z, k) = azN s(z, k)k.
Here z denotes her former husband’s productivity and the function Ns(z, k) de-
notes his labor supply. The function A determines how much child support a
former husband has to pay, which is assumed to be a fraction, a, of his current
income, zN s(z, k), per child. Obviously, for a single old female who was never
married z = 0.
Denote a single mother’s level of human capital investment in her children by
e = Es2(x, k, z).
This implies that Es2(x, k, z)=Q(T
s
2 (x, k, z), D
s
2(x, k, z), k), where T
s
2 (x, k, z) and
Ds2(x, k, z) are the decision rules for t and d that arise from P(1).
The maximized utility of a single old male is given by the following problem:
B2(z, k) =max
n
M(c, 0, 0, 1− n) P(2)
subject to
c ≡ Ψ(1, 0)[Y (0, n; 0, z)− aznk]
≡ zn− aznk = zn(1− ak), 0 < a < 1,
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where k denotes the number of children for whom he has to pay child support.
For a single old male who was never married k = 0.
3.2. Household Activity – Old Married Adults with k children
Nash Bargaining Problem: Consider a couple of type (x, z, γ, k) that is married in
the second period. Assume that they make their decisions by applying the Nash
solution to a fixed-threat bargaining game. Their problem is to solve
max
l,t,n,d
[F (c, e, k, 1− l − t)−G2(x, k, z)]× [M(c, e, k, 1− n)−B2(z, k)] P(3)
subject to
c = Ψ(2, k)[Y (l, n; x, z)− d]− γ = Ψ(2, k)[xl + zn− d]− γ,
and
e = Q(t, d, k).
Here B2(z, k) and G2(x, k, z) and are the threat points for the husband and wife.
They are the values of being single in the second period, and are given by the
solutions for old single agent problems, P(1) and P(2).
Denote the level of human capital investment per child in a family with two
old parents by
e = Em2 (x, z, γ, k).
Let the resulting utility levels for an old husband and wife in a (x, z, γ, k)-marriage,
or the values for M and F in P(3) evaluated at the optimal choices for l, t, n, d
and the implied values for c and e, be represented by
H2(x, z, γ, k),
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and
W2(x, z, γ, k). P’(3)
3.3. Marriage – Old Adults
Consider an age-2 couple indexed by (x, z, γ, k). Each party faces a decision:
should s/he choose married or single life for the period. Clearly, a married female
will want to remain married if and only if W2(x, z, γ, k) ≥ G2 (x, k, z); otherwise,
it is in her best interest to get a divorce. Equally as clearly, a single female
will desire to marry if and only if W2(x, z, γ, k) ≥ G2 (x, k, 0); otherwise, she’ll
go it alone. Similarly, a married male would wish to remain so if and only if
H2(x, z, γ, k) ≥ B2 (z, k), while a single male will like to marry if and only if
H2(x, z, γ, k) ≥ B2 (z, 0).
The matching decision of the age-2 couple can summarized by the following
indicator function:
Iq2(x, z, γ, k) =
 1, if W2(x, z, γ, k) ≥ G2(x, k, J(q)z)and H2(x, z, γ, k) ≥ B2(z, J(q)k)0, otherwise,
P(4)
which is defined for q = m, s, and where J(m) = 1 and J(s) = 0. Note the
indicator function depends upon the marital status, q, of the couple at the time
of the decision.
3.4. Household Activity – Single Young Adults
Now, let the odds of drawing a single age-1 female of type xi in the marriage
market be represented by
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Φ1 (xi) , where Φ1 (xi) ≥ 0 ∀xi and
SX
i=1
Φ1 (xi) = 1,
and the odds of meeting a single age-2 female of type xi with k children in the
marriage market be given by
Φ2 (xi, k) , where Φ2 (xi, k) ≥ 0 ∀xi and
SX
i=1
KX
k=0
Φ2 (xi, k) = 1.
Likewise, the odds of meeting a single age-i male of type zi will be denoted by
Ωj (zi) , where Ωj (zi) ≥ 0 ∀zi and
SP
i=1
Ωj (zi) = 1.
A key step in the analysis will be to compute these matching probabilities.
The programming problem for an one-period-old single type-xi female is
G1 (xi) = max
k.l,t,d
{F (c, e, k, 1− l − t) + β
SP
k=1
SP
l=1
mP
n=1
{W2(xk, zl, γn, k) Is2(xk, zl, γn, k)
+ G2(xk, k, 0) [1− Is2(xk, zl, γn, k)]}X(xk|xi)Ω2 (zl)Γ(γn)}. P(5)
subject to
c = Ψ(1, k)[Y (l, 0; xi, 0)− d] = Ψ(1, k)[xil − d],
and
e = Q(t, d, k).
In the above problem β is the discount factor. Here Ω2 (zl)Γ(γn) gives the prob-
ability that a single female of type xi will meet a single male of type zl and that
their match will be of quality γn. Note that W2(xk, zl, γn, k) is given by the so-
lution to the Nash Bargaining problem P(3) for a type-(xk, zl, γn, k) marriage.
16
Marriage is an option only if both parties agree; that is, when Is2(xk, zl, γn, k) = 1
– see P(4). The value G2(xk, k, 0) of remaining single is given by the solution to
the problem of an old single female, or by P(1). Last, note that in P(5) the in-
dicator function Is2(xk, zl, γn, k) chooses married or single life for the female when
old depending upon what is her in best interest to do. Married life must also
be feasible in the sense that her mate must agree.5 This is incorporated into the
indicator function’s construction.
Let the utility-maximizing decision rules for the quantity and quality of chil-
dren that solve this problem be represented by
k = Ks(xi),
and
e = Es1(xi, k) = E
s
1(xi, K
s(xi)).
The analogous recursion for a single male is
B1(zj) = max
n
{M(c, 0, 0, 1− n) + β
SP
l=1
SP
i=1
KP
k=0
mP
n=1
{H2(xi, zl, γn, k)Is2(xi, zl, γn, k)
+B2(zl, 0)[1− Is2(xi, zl, γn, k)]}Φ2(xi, k)Z(zl|zj)Γ(γn)}. P(6)
subject to
c = Ψ(1, 0)Y (0, n; 0, zj) = zjn,
where Φ2(xi, k)Γ(γn) is the probability of meeting an old single female of type-xi
with k children and having a match quality of γn.
5That is, here there is a bilateral search problem, as opposed to the more typical unilat-
eral job-search model, say as typified by the Andolfatto and Gomme (1996) and Hansen and
Imrohoroglu’s (1992) analyses of unemployment insurance.
17
3.5. Household Activity – Young Married Adults
Nash Bargaining Problem: Consider now the problem of a young married couple.
Applying the Nash Bargaining solution to the fixed-threat bargaining game facing
a young couple in a type-(xi, zj , γh) marriage gives
max
l,n,t,d,k
{{F (c, e, k, 1− l − t) + β
SP
v=1
SP
l=1
mP
n=1
[W2(xv, zl, γn, k) I
m
2 (xv, zl, γn, k)
+G2(xv, k, zl)[1− Im2 (xv, zl, γn, k)]]∆(γn|γh)X (xv|xi)Z(zl|zj)−G1(xi)}
×{M(c, e, k, 1− n) + β
SP
v=1
SP
l=1
mP
n=1
[H2(xv, zl, γn, k)I
m
2 (xv, zl, γn, k)
+B2(zl, k)[1− Im2 (xv, zl, γn, k)]]∆(γn|γh)X (xv|xi)Z(zl|zj)−B1(zj)}}P(7)
subject to
c = Ψ(2, k)[Y (l, n;xi, zj)− d]− γh = Ψ(2, k)[xil + zjn− d]− γh, (3.1)
and
e = Q(t, d, k). (3.2)
The threat points G1(xi) and B1(zj) are given by the solutions to the problems
for young single females and males.
Let the optimal decision rules for the quantity and quality of children in a
type-(xi, zj , γh) young marriage be denoted by
k = Km(xi, zj , γn),
and
e = Em1 (xi, zj , γh, k) = E
m
1 (xi, zj , γh, K
m(xi, zj , γh)).
Furthermore, let the expected lifetime utility for a young male and female arising
out of a type-(xi, zj, γh)-marriage be represented by
H1(xi, zj , γh), P’(7)
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and
W1(xi, zj, γh).
3.6. Marriage – Young Adults
Then the marriage decisions for a randomly matched young couple, (x, z, γ), is
given by
Is1(x, z, γ) =
 1, if W1(x, z, γ) ≥ G1 (x) and H1(x, z, γ) ≥ B1 (z) ,0, otherwise. P(8)
4. Equilibrium
4.1. Population Growth
The average number of children per female, k, is given by
k =
SP
i=1
SP
j=1
mP
h=1
Φ1 (xi)Ω1(zj)Γ(γh)I
s
1(xi, zj , γh)K
m(xi, zj, γh)
+
SP
i=1
Φ1 (xi) [1−
SP
j=1
mP
h=1
Ω1(zj)Γ(γh)I
s
1(xi, zj , γh)]K
s(xi).
To understand this formula, note that the probability of a type-(xi, zj , γh) mar-
riage between young adults is Φ1 (xi)Ω1(zj)Γ(γh)I
s
1(xi, zj , γh). This match will
generate Km(xi, zj, γh) kids. The odds that a woman will be type-xi and remain
single are Φ1 (xi) [1−
PS
j=1
Pm
h=1Ω1(zj)Γ(γh)I
s
1(xi, zj , γh)]. This woman will have
Ks(xi) children. In a stationary equilibrium the growth rate of the population, g,
will therefore be
g =
r
k
2
.
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4.2. Matching Probabilities
Young Adults: The probabilities of meeting a young female and male of a given
type in the marriage market are Φ1(x) and Ω1(z). To determine these probabili-
ties, let Υmm(xi, zj , γh, xk, zl, γn) represent the fraction of females who were mar-
ried in both periods and transited from state (xi, zj, γh) to (xk, zl, γn). Likewise,
let Υss(xi, xk) denote the fraction of females who were single in both periods, and
transited from xi to xk, and Υms(xi, zj, γh, xk, zl) denote the fraction of females
who suffered a marriage breakup, etc. Hence,
Υmm(xi, zj, γh, xk, zl, γn) ≡ Φ1 (xi)Ω1(zj)Γ(γh)Is1(xi, zj, γh)
×Im2 (xk, zl, γn, km)∆(γn|γh)X(xk|xi)Z(zl|zj),
Υss(xi, xk) ≡ Φ1 (xi) [1−
SP
j=1
mP
h=1
Γ(γh)Ω1(zj)I
s
1(xi, zj, γh)]
×X(xk|xi)[1−
SP
l=1
mP
n=1
Γ(γn)I
s
2(xk, zl, γn, k
s)Ω2(zl)],
Υms(xi, zj , γh, xk, zl) ≡ Φ1 (xi)Ω1(zj)Γ(γh)Is1(xi, zj, γh)X(xk|xi)Z(zl|zj)
× {
mP
n=1
∆(γn|γh)[1− Im2 (xk, zl, γn, km)]},
Υsm(xi, xk, zl, γn) ≡ Φ1 (xi) [1−
SP
j=1
mP
h=1
Γ(γh)Ω1(zj)I
s
1(xi, zj, γh)]
×Is2(xk, zl, γn, ks)Γ(γn)X(xk|xi)Ω2(zl), (4.1)
where km ≡ Km(xi, zj, γh) and ks ≡ Ks(xi).
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Then, it is easy to see that the odds of meeting a young woman of type-xr in
the marriage market are given by
Φ1(xr) = {
P
i,j,k,l,h,n
Ξ(xr|Em1 (xi, zj , γh, Km(xi, zj , γh)) + Em2 (xk, zl, γn,Km(xi, zj, γh)))
×Υmm(xi, zj , γh, xk, zl, γn)Km(xi, zj, γh)
+
P
i,k
Ξ(xr|Es1(xi, Ks(xi)) + Es2(xk, Ks(xi), 0))Υss(xi, xk)Ks(xi)
+
P
i,j,k,l,h
Ξ(xr|Em1 (xi, zj, γh, Km(xi, zj , γh)) + Es2(xk, Km(xi, zj, γh), zl))
×Υms(xi, zj , γh, xk, zl)Km(xi, zj , γh)
+
P
i,k,l,n
Ξ(xr|Es1(xi, Ks(xi)) + Em2 (xk, zl, γn, Ks(xi)))
×Υsm(xi, xk, zl, γn)Ks(xi)}/k. (4.2)
The probability of meeting a type-zr young man is determined analogously:
Ω1(zr) = {
P
i,j,k,l,h,n
Λ(zr|Em1 (xi, zj, γh,Km(xi, zj, γh)) + Em2 (xk, zl, γn, Km(xi, zj , γh)))
×Υmm(xi, zj , γh, xk, zl, γn)Km(xi, zj, γh)
+
P
i,k
Λ(zr|Es1(xi, Ks(xi)) + Es2(xk, Ks(xi), 0))Υss(xi, xk)Ks(xi)
+
P
i,j,k,l,h
Λ(zr|Em1 (xi, zj , γh, Km(xi, zj , γh)) + Es2(xk, Km(xi, zj , γh), zl))
×Υms(xi, zj , γh, xk, zl)Km(xi, zj , γh)
+
P
i,k,l,n
Λ(zr|Es1(xi,Ks(xi)) + Em2 (xk, zl, γn, Ks(xi)))
×Υsm(xi, xk, zl, γn)Ks(xi)}/k.
Old Adults: Next, how are the odds of meeting a single age-2 type-x female
with k children, Φ2 (x, k), or of a single age-2 type-z male, Ω2 (z) determined
in stationary equilibrium? This depends upon the number of single agents who
remain unmarried from the previous period. So, how many are there? Again,
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the number of married and single one-period-old type-xi females are given by
Φ1 (xi)
PS
j=1
Pm
h=1Ω1(zj)Γ(γh)I
s
1(xi, zj , γh) andΦ1 (xi) [1−
PS
j=1
Pm
h=1Ω1(zj)Γ(γh)I
s
1(xi, zj , γh)].
Given this supply of one-period-old single females, the quantity of two-period-old
type-xj single females will be
PS
i=1X(xj|xi)Φ1 (xi) [1−
PS
j=1
Pm
h=1Ω1(zj)Γ(γh)I
s
1(xi, zj, γh)].
Let
ℵ(xi, k) =
 1, if Ks(xi) = k,0, otherwise,
be an indicator function representing the number of children that a single one-
year-old female of type-xi has. Then, the odds of drawing a single two-period-old
type-xj female with k children in the marriage market will be
Φ2(xj , k) = {
SP
i=1
ℵ(xi, k)X(xj|xi)Φ1 (xi) [1−
SP
j=1
mP
h=1
Γ(γh)Ω1(zj)I
s
1(xi, zj , γh)]}
÷{
SP
j=1
SP
i=1
X(xj|xi)Φ1 (xi) [1−
SP
j=1
mP
h=1
Γ(γh)Ω1(zj)I
s
1(xi, zj, γh)]}.
The analogous formula for the odds of meeting a single two-period-old male of
type-zj, Ω2 (zi) , reads
Ω2 (zi) =
PS
j=1 Z(zi|zj)Ω1(zj)[1−
PS
i=1
Pm
h=1 Γ(γh)Φ1 (xi) I
s
1(xi, zj, γh)]PS
i=1
PS
j=1 Z(zi|zj)Ω1(zj)[1−
PS
i=1
Pm
h=1 Γ(γh)Φ1 (xi) I
s
1(xi, zj, γh)]
.
(4.3)
It’s now time to take stock of the situation so far.
Definition 4.1. A stationary matching equilibrium can be represented by set of
child quantity and quality allocation rules, Km(x, z, γ), Ks(x), Em2 (x, z, γ, k),
Es2(x, k, z), E
m
1 (x, z, γ, K
m(x, z, γ)), and Es1(x,K
s(x)), a set of marriage decision
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rules, Im2 (x, z, γ, k), I
s
2(x, z, γ, k), and I
s
1(x, z, γ), and a set of matching probabili-
ties, Φ1(x), Φ2(x, k), Ω1(z), and Ω2(z), such that:
1. The child quality allocation rule Es2(x, k, z) solves the old single female’s
household problem P(1).
2. The child quantity and quality allocation rules Ks(x) and Es1(x,K
s(x)) solve
the young single female’s household problem P(5).
3. The child quality allocation rule Em2 (x, z, γ, k) solves the married old couple’s
Nash bargaining problem P(3).
4. The child quality and quantity allocation rules Km(x, z, γ) andEm1 (x, z, γ, K
m(x, z, γ))
solve the young married couple’s Nash bargaining problem P(7).
5. The marriage decision an old currently married couple and an old currently
single one, Im2 (x, z, γ, k) and I
s
2(x, z, γ, k), are described by P(4), in con-
junction with P(1), P(2) and P’(3).
6. The marriage decision for a young couple, Is1(x, z, γ), is described by P(8),
in conjunction with P(5), P(6) and P’(7).
7. The matching probabilities, Φ1(x), Φ2(x, k), Ω1(z), and Ω2(z), are governed
by the stationary distributions described by (4.2) to (4.3).
At a general level, not much can be said about the properties of the above
model since the solution involves a complicated fixed-point problem. On the one
hand, in order to compute the solution to a young single agent’s choice problem
one needs to know the equilibrium matching probabilities. On the other hand,
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calculating the equilibrium matching probabilities requires knowledge about the
solutions to each of the decision problems.
5. Some Computational Analysis
5.1. Benchmark Equilibrium
To gain some insight into the model’s mechanics, its solution will be computed
numerically.6 To do this, values must be assigned to the model’s parameters.
These are listed in Table 1. The parameter values are not chosen to tune the model
to be in perfect harmony with any features of the real world. Instead, they are
picked to generate an equilibrium that displays several interesting characteristics
6Part of the numerical procedure used to compute the model’s solution is outlined in the
Appendix. The algorithm for finding the equilibrium type distributions, or the Φ’s and Ω’s, is
similar to that employed in Aiyagari, Greenwood, and Guner (2000). For more detail, see that
source.
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that will now be discussed.
TABLE 1: Benchmark Parameter Values
Tastes νf = 0.5, ωf = 1, ξf = 0.325, ϑf = 0.2,
δf = 3, ιf = 0.05, ςf = 0.3, β = 0.67,
νm = 0.5,ωm = 1, ξm = 0.325, ϑm = 0.35,
δm = 3, ιm = 0.0325, ςm = 0.3.
Technology b = 0.30, η = 0.5,
α = 0.5, κ1 = 0.4, κ2 = 0.5,
ε1 = 15.15, ε2 = 0.5,
Stochastic Structure µx|e = µz|e = ln[ε1(e−2 + e−1)
ε2 ], σx|e = σx|e = 0.4,
ρx = 0.7, ρz = 0.7,
Γ(γ1) = Γ(γ2) = 0.5, ∆(γ1|γ1) = ∆(γ2|γ2) = 0.5, γ1 = 2.5, γ2 = 0,
Simulation Control S = 15, K = 4, m = 2,
Policy Variables a = 0.05.
Properties of the Equilibrium: First, observe from Table 2 that at any point in
time a significant proportion of the adult population is not married. In equilibrium
some people are always single, others experience a divorce. At any time about
85% of the population is married.
Table 2: Marital Status
(Percentage Distribution)
Young Old
Married 86 85
Single 14 5
Divorced — 10
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Second, family income is related to marital status, as Table 3 illustrates. For
example, family income for a household headed by a young single female is 17%
of that for a married couple. This transpires for two reasons. To begin with, in
a marriage there are two potential wage earners versus only one in a household
with a single adult. Additionally, married males and females work more than
unmarried ones – Table 4.7
Table 3: Family Income
Young Old
Married 1.00 1.00
Single – female 0.17 0.14
Single – male 0.36 0.41
Divorced – female 0.24
Divorced – male 0.33
Table 4: Time Allocations
Male Female
Married Single Divorced Married Single Divorced
Work 0.60 0.44 0.41 0.37 0.27 0.27
Nurture 0 0 0 0.21 0.10 0.10
Leisure 0.34 0.56 0.59 0.33 0.46 0.52
Fixed 0.06 0 0 0.09 0.17 0.12
Third, fertility is also related to marital status. Single women have a much
higher fertility rate than married women do. A young married woman has 1.8 kids
7Additionally, in the model married males tend to earn more than unmarried ones since they
make better mates. This is true in the data, too — see Cornwall and Rupert (1997).
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on average while a young single woman has 3.3. So, while 85% of the population
is married, only 78.5% of children live in a household with two adults. On average
a female has two children; therefore, the population is stationary.
Fourth, children from a single-female family tend to do much worse. This is
because their mother doesn’t have much time or money to invest in them. A single
mother has less time for work, nurture, and leisure because she has more children
on average; i.e., more of her time is absorbed on the fixed costs of child rearing.
Since she earns less money than a married couple, she has less resources to invest
in her offspring also. Additionally, single women tend to have more children than
do married women. The result of these facts is a lower level of human capital
investment per child in a single female family – Table 5.
Table 5: Investment in Human Capital
Young Old
Married 1.00 0.99
Single female 0.30 0.29
Divorced female 0.37
Table 6 shows the effect of family background on a female’s income. A girl
growing up in a household with a single mother can expect to enjoy only two-
thirds of the family income of one growing up with both parents. She is much
more likely (44% versus 20%) to experience an out of wedlock birth or a divorce
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than the girl from a two-parent home too – Table 7.
Table 6: Effects of Childhood History on Female Income
Childhood History m→ m m→ s s→ m s→ s
Expected Wage 1.00 0.79 0.75 0.54
Expected Family Income 1.00 0.87 0.85 0.68
Table 7: Effects of Childhood History on Female Marital Experience
Adult History m→ m m→ s s→ m s→ s
Childhood History
m→ m 0.80 0.09 0.08 0.03
m→ s 0.73 0.11 0.11 0.06
s→ m 0.71 0.11 0.11 0.06
s→ s 0.56 0.17 0.16 0.12
The Income Distribution: Some income distribution statistics for both the US
economy and the model are reported in Table 8. The figures for the US are based
on a cross section of annual household income for 1992, as reported in the Panel
Study on Income Dynamics (PSID). The table reports the cutoff levels of income
corresponding to different percentiles of the income distribution. The number for
the 1st percentile is normalized to one. Hence, in the US data a household who lies
at the 5th percentile of the income distribution has an income 2.56 times greater
than that of a household who is at the 1st percentile. The corresponding figure
for the model is 2.00. While the model does a reasonable job matching the data,
Table 8 shows that the poor in the model are relatively poorer than in the data,
but the rich are not as rich. It is not surprising that the model does not generate
enough skewness at the upper end of the income distribution. It does not allow
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for entrepreneurs, superstars, and other features of the labor market. The upshot
is that the mean-to-median ratio in the data is 1.26, as compared with 1.12 in the
model.
The Fertility-Income Relationship: Figure 1 shows the relationship between
income and family size for both the model and the US. The data for the US comes
from the Panel Study on Income Dynamics (PSID). The earnings variable is the
present value of future lifetime household labor income at age 30, as calculated
by Knowles (1999). In the data, fertility declines with labor income. The fertility
variable is total number of children ever born to a woman, who is either head or
spouse of the household head. The model replicates this relationship quite well.
It makes a difference whether family or per-capita income is used. When
family income is adjusted for size, the situation portrayed in Table 3 changes.
Single males do relatively better now, since they have no dependents. Perhaps,
this is why they work the least. The situation for unmarried females is now even
bleaker. Income per family member is only 16% of the level realized in a married
household – Table 9. The distribution of income is more skewed when income
per member is used. The mean-to-median ratio increases from 1.12 to 1.24 in the
model. The rise is more modest in the data, from 1.26 to 1.33. The increase in
the model is more significant than the one in data because the number of kids
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declines a little too sharply with family income – Figure 1.
Table 8: Income Distribution
Income Level at the Cutoff (normalized)
Percentile Data Model
1 1.00 1.00
5 2.56 2.00
10 3.85 2.84
25 6.79 6.79
50 14.37 13.97
75 23.44 19.58
90 34.07 25.96
95 43.21 30.56
99 77.5 40.92
Table 9: Family Income per Member
Young Old
Married 1.00 0.97
Single – female 0.16 0.12
Single – male 1.28 1.48
Divorced – female 0.26
Divorced – male 1.18
5.2. Some Comparative Statics Exercises
To gain some insight into the structure of the model, several comparative statics
exercises will be undertaken now.
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Elasticity on Quality, ϑf : Suppose that the elasticity on the quality of children
in the female’s utility function is lowered from 0.2 to 0.19. What happens? The
return at the margin from investing time and resources in children declines more
rapidly now. Hence, parents will tend to invest less in their offspring. Instead,
they will choose to have more children. That is, they now prefer quantity relative
to quality. Married females now have 2.0 children on average (versus 1.8 earlier)
while single ones have 3.7 (as compared with 3.3). The population’s annualized
growth rate increases to 0.73% [= (1.0751/10 − 1) × 100%]. Since there is less
investment per child, the average quality of the mating pool drops. The fraction
of married agents falls by about 3 percentage points.
The Fixed Time Costs of Childrearing, ιf and ιm: Let the fixed time cost
of raising a child for a female drop. Specifically, let ιf fall from 0.05 to 0.04.
Since the cost of raising a child has fallen, there are more children in equilibrium.
Married females now have 2.1 children on average while single ones have 3.9.
Since single females have the most children, the attractiveness of being a single
mother increases. This, too, raises the average number of children per female.
These factors lead the population’s annualized growth rate to increase to 0.98%.
The long-run quality of the mating pool drops. The increase in the quantity of
children comes at the expense of their quality. All parents invest less per child.
There are also more single mothers and they invest less in their children than
do married ones. These tendencies operate to lower the long-run quality of the
matching pool. As a result of these factors, in the new equilibrium the number of
marriages falls by about 4 percentage points.
Leisure Elasticity, ςf : What will happen if the utility function for women is
made more elastic with respect to leisure? In particular, let ςf = 0.35 as opposed
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to 0.30. Women are now willing to work more – both at home and in the market
– since the disutility from working is not rising as fast in terms of effort. There
is now more investment of both goods and time in children. Since married women
work the most this increases the benefit of marriage. The quality of the matching
pool also rises. The upshot of this is that the number of young single mothers falls
by about 0.7 percentage points. Married women have more children, since at the
margin the disutility from raising more of them has dropped. The population’s
growth rate decreases slightly (because the number of young single women drops).
Consumption Elasticities, νf and νm: Consider the impact of making the
utility function more curved in consumption. Reset νf = νm = 0.4, as opposed
to the value of 0.5 adopted earlier. The number of marriages now rises by 8.5
percentage points. The population’s growth rate increases to 0.6% per period. The
question is, why? When the marginal utility from consumption declines faster,
parents divert more of their income into children. They choose to increase both
the quantity and quality of their offspring. Additionally, the extra consumption
that males realize from single life is valued less. There will be less children living
with a single parent. These considerations increase the long-run quality of the
mating pool. The number of marriages rises, therefore, on these accounts.
Shock Structure: How does the structure of the shocks affect the equilibrium?
To explore this, the degree of persistence in the matching shock is increased. Now,
∆(γ1|γ1) = ∆(γ2|γ2) = 0.9. This leads to drop in the rate of marriage among
the young (from 86 to 74%). When there is a bad match quality shock it will
now persist into the future making marriage less attractive. Since there are more
single mothers, the population’s growth rate increases to about 0.5% per period.
Likewise, increasing persistence in either or both of the type shocks has a similar
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effect.
5.3. Nash Bargaining
How does Nash Bargaining work in the model? The Nash Bargaining solution
solves a Pareto problem between husband and wife – the details are in the Ap-
pendix. Therefore, there exists some set of weights ρ and (1−ρ) such that solving
a type-(xi, zj , γh) young couple’s Nash Bargaining problem, P(8), is equivalent to
solving the Pareto problem
max
l,n,t,d,k
{(1− ρ){F (c, e, k, 1− l − t) + β
SP
v=1
SP
l=1
mP
n=1
[W2(xv, zl, γn, k) I
m
2 (xv, zl, γn, k)
+G2(xv, k, zl)[1− Im2 (xv, zl, γn, k)]]∆(γn|γh)X (xv|xi)Z(zl|zj)}
+ρ{M(c, e, k, 1− n) + β
SP
v=1
SP
l=1
mP
n=1
[H2(xv, zl, γn, k)I
m
2 (xv, zl, γn, k)
+B2(zl, k)[1− Im2 (xv, zl, γn, k)]]∆(γn|γh)X (xv|xi)Z(zl|zj)}},
subject to (3.1) and (3.2).8 The Pareto weight ρ reflects the husband’s bargaining
power and is endogenously determined as a function of the state (xi, zj , γh).
Figure 2 shows how this weight behaves as a function of the state (x, z, γ).
Take the case where the match quality variable has the high value. Observe that
the male’s bargaining strength increases with the level of his productivity, z, and
decreases with his wife’s, x. The same is true when the match quality variable
takes on the low value. As can be seen, most matches end with a marriage. When
match quality is low, nobody want to be stuck with a low type. Thus, the degree
of assortative mating is fairly low. This may be an artifact of two-period nature
of the model. If you reject your mate today, then you only have one more chance
8This does not say that the model’s general equilibrium is Pareto optimal. In general, it’s
not.
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in the future. Hence, this may be rectified by adding more periods. Alternatively,
this could be fixed up by having an individual’s draw on the marriage market
being influenced by his or her type.9
Now, suppose that the model is solved holding the weight ρ fixed across states.
For example let ρ = 0.5, which gives husband and wife an equal say in family deci-
sion making, so to speak. The number of marriages plummets in equilibrium from
about 85 to 49%. Why? When the weights are fixed, utility can’t be transferred
from one party to the other in order to prevent a breakup and therefore not nearly
as many marriages are sustainable. The degree of positive assortative mating is
much higher than under the Nash Bargaining solution. Figure 3 shows the set
of sustainable marriages in the economy with Nash Bargaining – i.e., the set of
(x, z, γ) for which Is1(x, z, γ) = 1. With a good match quality shock virtually all
matches are sustainable. Even when the quality of the match is low most matches
are sustainable. No female, however, wants a male from the low end of the distri-
bution. Males aren’t quite as choosy. When each party’s bargaining power is held
fixed, there is a high degree of assortative mating as Figure 4 illustrates. Now,
when the quality of match is poor most marriages aren’t sustainable.
6. Two Public Policy Experiments
Child tax credits are designed to elevate the welfare of all children in the economy.
They transfer income away from families without children to families with them.
Child support payments are targeted at those children who experience a family
9Fernandez and Rogerson (1999) study the relationship between marital sorting and inequal-
ity. In their work, agents are exogenously married according to some probability structure that
depends on their type.
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breakup because their parents get divorced. Here, to ease the devastating impact
that a divorce can have on family income, governments require fathers to pay
child support to their former wives. To illustrate how a model such as this can
be used, consider the effects of these two public policies.
6.1. Child Tax Credits
Suppose that all families with children, both single and two-parent families, are
eligible to collect a child subsidy. This subsidy provides a tax credit per child
equal to 0.5% of the average level of income in the benchmark economy. It is
financed by a lump-sum tax equal to 1.0% of income in the benchmark economy.
What are the effects of this policy?
On the upside, the beneficial effects of the policy are twofold. First, poor
families will get extra income that should allow them to invest more time and
resources in their children. Second, it should make marriage a more attractive
option for males, since single males are taxed without receiving any subsidy. On
the downside, the attractiveness of marriage for females, however, might decline.
Second, the beneficial aspects of this policy for children may be dissipated by
larger family size.
The long-run health of the economy is not helped by this policy. First, the
percentage of single mothers increases by about 4.5 percentage points. The per-
centage of children living with a young single mother rises by about 7 percentage
points. This transpires because young single mothers tend to have more children
than married ones, and because the policy promotes fertility. The (annualized)
population growth rate rises from 0.13 to 1.07%. Single mothers now have 3.9
children as compared with 3.3 for the benchmark economy. Married women now
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average 2.1 children (versus 1.8 previously).
To understand the model’s mechanics, it pays to artificially decompose the
experiment into short- and long-run effects. For the short-run effects consider the
impact of the child tax credit holding fixed the type distributions for young agents,
or Φ1 and Ω1. This shuts down the effects on the economy from any induced
changes in parental human capital investments. The percentage of single mothers
rises by 2 percentage points. Both single and married women have more children
(3.8 and 2.0). Married couples also substitute quality for quantity of children. The
rise in female headship also reduces the average level of human capital investment
in children. These effects operate to reduce the long-run quality of the mating
pool, leading to a further 3 point rise in the percentage of single mothers.
Average income in the economy falls by about 11%. This occurs because there
is now much less human capital investment in children. First, the increase in
female headship is associated with a reduction in investment in children. Single
mothers have less wherewithal – in terms of both time and goods – than married
couples. Second, with an increase in the quantity of children there is a fall in
their quality. As the price of having an extra child drops parents – married
or otherwise – substitute quantity for quality. Figure 5 shows the impact of a
child tax credit on the steady-state utility distributions for males and females.
The policy makes males worse off in the sense that the utility distribution for the
benchmark economy stochastically dominates the one for the economy with the
child tax credit. This isn’t the case for females. Women in the lower strata of
the economy are better off with a child tax credit. The rest are slightly worse
off. The poorest women have the largest number of children so a tax credit helps
them the most. Since women value children more than men (single men don’t
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value them at all), the overall effect of the tax credit on women’s expected utility
is less detrimental than it is for men.
Endogenous Fertility: Is it important to include a fertility decision in models of
marriage and divorce? The answer is yes. To see this, redo the above experiment
holding fixed the distribution of fertility across young woman. The effects of the
child tax credit on a woman’s fertility are therefore shut down. The presence of a
child tax credit now has little impact on family structure. The percentage of single
mothers living in the economy now rises slightly, an increase of only 0.3 percentage
points (compared with 4.5 earlier). The percentage of children living a young
single mother moves up by 0.5 percentage points (versus 7.0 before). Average
income in the economy now rises by 2.1% (as opposed to -11.4% previously)!
When fertility is held fixed, families invest more in each of their children. This
has an uplifting effect on society. The welfare gains from a child tax credit may
be completely wiped away (and even reversed), however, by an increase in family
size (especially for young single mothers).
6.2. Child-Support Payments
The per-child rate of support is set in the benchmark equilibrium at 5.0% of
the male’s income. What is the effect of this policy? The answer obtained by
comparing the benchmark equilibrium to one without child support.
The removal of child support leads to a 0.65 point drop in the percentage of
marriages. This is caused by both a rise in the number of young single females
(0.8 percentage points) and an increase in divorces among the old (0.3 percentage
points). Average income falls by about 1%. The rate of growth in the population
rises ever so slightly from 0.13 to 0.19%. These effects seem moderate. The
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question is why.
One would expect that child support would make marriage and divorce less
attractive for males and more attractive for females. The net impact will depend
on which party is more likely to walk from a marriage. When child support is
eliminated, marriages between high-type males and low-type females turn out to
be more likely to break up. Without child support, a high-type male demands
more than his low-type wife is willing to bear. Marriages between low-type males
and high-type females, however, are less likely to dissolve. With child support in
place, high-type females ask for more than a low-type male is willing to contribute
to a marriage. The net effect on the equilibrium number of divorces is very small.
Some of the drop in the equilibrium number of marriages derives from the fact
that divorced mothers now invest less in their children (about 7% drop in e) and
this drives down the long-run quality of the mating pool. This can be seen by
examining the impact of removing child support, which is done by holding the
type distributions for young agents, or Φ1 and Ω1, fixed. Again, this turns off
the effects on the economy from any induced changes in parental human capital
investments. When this is done the number of marriages drops by 0.45 percentage
points. Hence, about 0.20 percentage points of the fall in the number of marriages
is due to the drop in the long-run quality of the mating pool.
Nash Bargaining, again: The elimination of child support leads to some inter-
esting reallocations within the family. When child support is eliminated an older
female has a lower threat point. So her husband has relatively more bargaining
power. Let B2 and C2 denote the combinations of (x, z, γ, k) that generate viable
marriages among the old in the benchmark and no-child support equilibriums.
The old male’s weight increases for each and every (x, z, γ, k) ∈ B2 ∩ C2. The
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average weight for males rises from 0.57 to 0.60. Older females do indeed work
more.10 Their leisure falls by almost 4 percentage points. Almost all of this is due
to increased work in the market. (These changes are also due in part to the fact
that high-type women constitute a larger fraction of marriages now.) Now, con-
sider the impact on a young male’s weight. Denote by B1 and C1 the combinations
of (x, z, γ) that generate viable marriages among in the benchmark and no-child
support steady states. Surprisingly, a young male’s weight decreases for each and
every (x, z, γ) ∈ B1∩C1! Why? A young female realizes that the gains from being
married when she is old are lower when there is no child support in place. Hence,
she will be more reluctant to marry when she is young. She demands more from
her young suitor. Figure 6 shows the decline in the young male’s weight, ρ, that
occurs when child-support is withdrawn – the figure shows the average weight
for each type of married male. On average, the young male’s weight falls from
0.61 to 0.60. Therefore, some of the gains that males realize when child support
is removed are redistributed back to females. A young married female’s leisure
rises by 1.8 percentage points, on average.
Last, the manner in which households undertake their decision-making appears
to be important for analyzing the consequences of economic policy. To see this,
suppose that the Nash bargaining weights are held at their benchmark values
when child support payments are eliminated. Now, the equilibrium number of
marriages plummets by 10 percentage points. Average income drops by 18%. A
10To calculate the average one needs to know how many type-(x, z, γ, k) marriages there
are. The distribution of marriages will be different for the benchmark and no-child support
economies. The average was computed using the distribution from the benchmark economy –
so as to not contaminate the changes in the male’s weights with the shift in the distribution.
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marriage is no longer as flexible as before. One party is less able to transfer utility
to the other in order to keep the marriage viable.11
7. Conclusion
An overlapping generations model of marriage, divorce, and the quantity and
quality of children is developed here to study the distribution of income. Singles
meet in a marriage market and are free to accept or reject marriage proposals from
the opposite sex. Likewise, married agents must decide whether or not to remain
with their current spouses. Within a marriage, decisions about how much to work,
the number of children, and the amount of time and money to invest per child are
decided by Nash Bargaining. In the model’s general equilibrium, some adults are
married while others aren’t. Some females have children in wedlock, others out
of it. Marital status and income are related. Families headed by a single mother
are the poorest. Likewise, fertility and income are also related. Fertility declines
with income. Single mothers have the most children. Children raised by a single
mother have a greater tendency (relative to other children) to grow up poor due
to a lack of human capital investment. The distribution of income is more skewed
when family size is taken into account.
Can social policies be designed to improve the society’s welfare? Future gen-
erations of the prototype model may shed insight on such questions. To illustrate
11An efficient marriage contract would specify, at the time of marriage, childsupport and
alimony payments as a function of each parties type. Such contracts will not be time consistent,
so enforceability is an issue. Modelling such contracts would greatly complicate the current
analysis. Flinn (forth.) analyzes the determination of child support payments between divorced
parents.
40
how the model could be used in such a context the impact of child tax credit
and child support payments are considered. When the number of children is held
fixed, child tax credits increase the amount of income per child. But, the number
of children cannot be held fixed since the policy promotes an increase in family
size. It also reduces the attractiveness of marriage for females. On net, child tax
credits fail to elevate the well being of society.
Child support payments are aimed to insulate children from the drop in family
income that occurs when their parents divorce. Child support payments should
make divorce more attractive for females and less attractive for males. The effect
on the equilibrium number of marriages is small. This is because child support
payments reduce marital breakups between high-type males and low-type females,
but promote breakups between low-type males and high-type females. This ex-
periment highlights the fact that the form of household decision making may be
important for designing public policy. Child support payments transfer resources
away from husbands toward wives, other things equal. This strengthens the hand
of married women vis à vis their husbands. With Nash bargaining utility can
be transferred away from a husband to a wife to keep a marriage sustainable, so
long as it is in the husband’s interest to do so. But, to the extent that single
males have the option to remain unmarried, part of this transfer will be undone
by renegotiating the terms of marriage. Last, the model is still too crude to place
confidence in the results for these two policy experiments. Future generations of
the model, however, may be able to enlist in public service.
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8. Appendix A: Algorithm for Nash Bargaining
Representing the Nash Bargaining Problem as a Pareto Problem: Consider the
Nash Bargaining problem when the number of children, k, is held fixed. The Nash
Bargaining problem can be reformulated as a Pareto problem, a fact demonstrated
later. Therefore, for some Pareto weight ρ(k) ∈ (0, 1) it solves
max
0≤n,l,t≤1,d
{(1− ρ(k))[F (c, e, k, 1− l − t)−G (x, k, z)
+ ρ(k)[M(c, e, k, 1− n)−B (z, k)]}, P(11)
subject to the constraints for household production and human capital investment.
Given the presence of the inequality constraints this is a nontrivial Kuhn-Tucker
problem. For instance, in some marriages the woman will work in the market,
while in others she won’t.
Consider the case where an interior solution obtains. The first-order conditions
for an interior solution are:
(1− ρ(k))Fc + ρ(k)Mc = −ρ(k)Mn
Ψz
, (8.1)
(1− ρ(k))Fc + ρ(k)Mc = −(1− ρ(k)) Fl
Ψx
, (8.2)
[(1− ρ(k))Fe + ρ(k)Me]Qt = −(1− ρ(k))Ft, (8.3)
and
Ψ[(1− ρ(k))Fc + ρ(k)Mc] = [(1− ρ(k))Fe + ρ(k)Me]Qd. (8.4)
Observe that when ρ(k) = [F +W − G]/{[M + H− B] + [F +W − G]} the
solution to the Pareto problem P(11) will correspond with the solution to
max
0≤n,l,t≤1,d
{ [F (c, e, k, 1− l − t) +W−G (x, k, z)]
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×[M(c, e, k, 1− n) + H−B (z, k)]}, P(12)
subject to the constraints for household production and human capital investment,
and whereW and H are the continuation values associated with the married state.
This fact is readily verifiable by comparing the first-order conditions associated
with the two problems while imposing the condition ρ(k) = [F +W−G]/{[M +
H − B] + [F +W − G]}. This shows that the solution to the Nash Bargaining
problem solves a Pareto problem.
Solving the Nash Bargaining problem: It is easier to solve numerically the
Pareto problem P(11) than the Nash Bargaining problem P(12). The Nash bar-
gaining problem can only be easily solved on the set of viable marriages. In
advance it is hard to know what this set is. To compute the solution to the
Pareto problem requires finding the weight ρ(k) that maximizes the product of
the net gains from marriage, again holding fixed the number of children, k. So,
the algorithm proceeds by making a guess for ρ(k). The problem P(11) is then
solved using this guess. This involves numerically solving the set of equations
(8.1) to (8.4), or their analogues that incorporate the appropriate Kuhn-Tucker
conditions – a married woman may not work in the market, for instance. This
gives values for F and M . The weight is then updated using the formula
ρ(k) = min{max{ [F +W−G]
[M + H−B] + [F +W−G] , δ}, 1− δ},
for some small δ > 0. Therefore, 0 < ρ(k) < 1. The Pareto problem is then
recomputed using the new weight. The algorithm proceeds until a fixed point is
found. This gives the values of M + H − B and F +W − G for a fixed number
of kids, k. Sometimes a fixed point cannot be found, because the marriage is not
viable. For a marriage to be viable, M +H−B and F +W−G must both exceed
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zero. Observe that if M + H − B < 0 then ρ(k) > 1, while if F +W − G < 0
then ρ(k) < 0. Therefore, it is easy deduce which marriages are viable or not. For
example, set ρ(k) = 1− δ and solve the Pareto problem P(11). If M +H−B < 0
then there is no viable marriage from the male’s perspective.
Last, when the number of kids is also a choice variable the algorithm then
picks k ∈ K over the set of viable marriages to maximize the Nash Product:
max
k∈K
[F +W−G][M + H−B].
Now, let k∗ denote the solution to the above problem and define ρ by ρ = ρ(k∗).
This is the weight used in the couple’s Pareto problem outlined in Section 5.3.12
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